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APPEAL AND ERROR HARMLESS AND PREJUDICIAL ERROR In the
trial of defendant for embezzlement, the prosecutor's opening address to the
jury included a hearsay statement, regarding a tacit admission by defendant,
tending to establish his guilt. Subsequently in the trial such hearsay statement
was not allowed in evidence and the defendant now claims on appeal from
conviction that the opening statement was prejudicial and thus he is entitled to
a new trial. Held, that the statute governing reversals by an appellate court
for prejudicial errors did not apply; and that a new trial follows as a matter of
course because of a deprivation of the constitutional right to fair jury trial by
the admission of the improper evidence in prosecutor's opening statement. People
v. Bigge, 288 Mich. 417, 285 N. W. 5 (1939).
The Michigan court was operating under a statute similar to statutes existing in a majority of the states.1 The general interpretation of such statutes is

1 Mich. Comp. Laws (1929), § 17354: "No judgment or verdict shall be set
aside or reversed or a new trial be granted by any court of this state in any criminal
case, on the ground of misdirection of the jury, or the improper admission or rejecttion of evidence, or for error as to any matter of pleading or procedure, unless in the
opinion of the court, after an examination of the entire cause, it shall affirmatively
appear that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice." At least
one-half of the states have similar statutes, providing there shall be no reversal unless
alleged error complained of is prejudicial to substantial rights of adverse party, Wis.
Stat. (1937), § 274.3]; or "affects the merits of the judgment, decision, or decree
complained of," Tenn. Code (Michie, 1938), § 10653; or, finally, "substantial justice"
has not been done to such complaining party, Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1938), § 11364-

394

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 38

that the appellate court wiII consider the whol~ cause from the record and
evidence brought before it, and will not reverse the decision if a correction of
the alleged error would not change the .final result even though an erroneous
ruling had been committed.2 Courts interpreting the statute distinguish between
technical errors 8 and substantial or fundamental errors 4 affecting the constitutional rights of litigants, holding that the statute applies 5 only to the technical
errors committed by trial courts during the trial or by litigants during pleading;
thus the fundamental errors so mentioned require a reversal per se. The technical errors are subdivided into two groups. The group requiring reversal as
affecting the .final outcome are denominated prejudicial technical errors 6 and
often are called substantial errors. 7 The second group includes those technical
errors denominated non-prejudicial or harmless errors, and thus do not require
a reversal as not affecting the outcome of the case. Often, th_e court will put the
error in one or the other of the main classifications so depicted above, depending on whether it feels the case requires a reversal per se or not, and_ such seems
to be the majority opinion of the present Michigan case under discussion. The
error committed resulted in the admission of inadmissible evidence, and would
be generally considered by most courts as a mere technical error 8 and. thus not
grounds for reversal in and of itself. However, the principal decision changed
this about and said that allowing such evidence to get before the jury was a
deprivation of the constitutional right to a fair trial with all incidents thereto;
or, in other words, one has a constitutional right to a fair trial, and if not
2 Concerning alleged admission of erroneous evidence, the Indiana court, on
review, said: "If the particular items ••• had been excluded ••• it is apparent, in view
of remaining evidence, that the jury could not have done otherwise in the discharge
of its duty to convict appellant''; and thus affirmed conviction regardless of erroneous
admission of such matter. Sanderson v. State, 169 Ind. 301 at 315, 82 N. E. 525
(1907). See also Riggins v. State, 78 Fla. 459, 83 So. 267 (1919); State v. Morris,
83 Ore. 429, 163 P. 567 (1917). All these courts realize that the end of a trial
should be to attain the truth, and once attained, a mere technicality should not render
it void.
8
Such technical errors are numerous and a few examples are: improper admission
of evidence to prove a fact already established, Tilly v. State, 21 Fla. 242 (1885);
failure of attorney to keep within time allotted for address to jury, Walker v. State,
185 Ind. 240, II3 N. E. 753 (1916); erroneous instruction though verdict right on
evidence, Long v. State, 192 Ind. 524, 137 N. E. 49 (1922).
4
Fundamental errors depriving one of constitutional right to trial by jury embodies such rights as notice, hearing, trial by fair and competent tribunal, freedom from
,elf-incrimination, etc.
5
People v. 0'Bryan, 165 Cal. 55, 130 P. 1042 (1913), vividly sets out the
limited application of the statute.
6 Harmful charge assuming essential facts not established is reversible, Goodbread
v. Thomas, 82 Fla. 4n, 90 So. 156· (1921); admitting evidence of collateral crimes
independent of one in question is reversible, Gafford v. State, 79 Fla. 581, 84 So.
602 (1920).
7
The common usage by courts of term "substantial_ errors" when referring to
prejudicial technical errors should not be confused with "substantial errors" when
referring to those affecting the constitutional rights of litigants.
8
Compare State v. Williams, 28 Nev. 395, 82 P. 353 (1905).
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obtained, a reversal follows without further consideration. The dissent in the
principal case asserts one has no right to a perfect trial, realizing that the purpose of this statute is to take care of just such technical error as was committed
here. The fact that the statute expressly mentions errors in admission or rejection of evidence seems to sustain the view that to deny one a perfect trial by an
erroneous ruling on evidence is not an invasion of a constitutional right, for if it
were, reversal would necessarily follow without perusing the evidence as a whole
as the statute requires in just such a case. A few courts still act automatically and
in the face of such statutes continue the old practice of presuming prejudice and
declaring reversals for any and all errors, while the courts of other states vacillate between following and completely ignoring the statutory provisions.I' How>ever, the majority of the courts in states possessing such statutes seem to be cognizant of the time, money, and excess litigation saved by acting in accordance
with its provisions, and consequently do so. In considering such statutes, it is
also important to note who has the burden of proving the prejudicial technical
errors which would warrant a reversal. The burden usually falls on the appellant or party complaining; 10 however, some courts persist in putting the burden
on the appellee in both a criminal and civil appeal and thus require him to show
that the errors complained of are not prejudicial in order to warrant an affirmance.11 The fact that the statute provides "that it shall affirmatively appear''
that there be prejudicial error is some basis for placing the burden of proof on
the appellant. All courts agree that appellant must show "doubt" 12 as to whether
the error was prejudicial and affected the final outcome, while some of them
require appellant to go further and "clearly" 18 show actual prejudice. In due
regard to the purposes of the statute, it is submitted that the minority decision
in the principal case is more reasonable in refusing reversal unless a correction
of the technical error would warrant a change in the final outcome of the case.

9 Vacillation by one court in one day illustrated in People v. Bonier, 179 N. Y.
315, 72 N. E. 226 (1904), which presumes prejudice and reverses; while in People
v. Davey, 179 N. Y. 345, 72 N. E. 244 (1904), the same court expressly asserts that
cases should not be reversed on mere technical errors.
10 Griswold v. State, 77 Fla. 505, 82 So. 44 (1919); Cape Girardeau & Chester
R.R. v. Blechle, 234 Mo. 471, 137 S. W. 974 (19n).
11 People v. Pierce, 218 App. Div. 254, 218 N. Y. S. 249 (1926); Salisbury
v. Goddard, 79 Ore. 593, 156 P. 261 (1916).
12 Riley v. State, 95 Ind. 446 (1884); Stalcup v. State, 146 Ind. 270, 45 N. E.
334 (1896).
18 State v. Merlo, 92 Ore. 678, 173 P. 317, 182 P. 153 (1919).

